Executive Summary

This report addresses the Minnesota Department of Public Safety’s (DPS) planning and deployment activities of January 2021 to May 2021 related to the incident response preparations for the March 2021 Derek Chauvin trial (including staff deployment prior to the trial’s conclusion) referred to as Operation Safety Net (OSN) and includes a discussion of the civil unrest in Brooklyn Center in April 2021. The report highlights strengths and suggests areas for improvement solely for DPS and its divisions - DPS did not review the actions of the other governmental agencies that participated in the OSN planning and response. Each DPS division identified its strengths and areas for improvement (the latter of which are outlined in this brief summary), the full report includes both the identified strengths and areas for improvement.

Overview

In July of 2020, the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) and Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO) began planning for potential protests and criminal activities resulting from the Chauvin trial (venued in Hennepin County). The operation was named “Operation Safety Net” and focused on the City of Minneapolis and the immediate area in and around the Hennepin County Government Center. The operation plan was originally referred to as “Twin City Trial Preparation,” however, “Operation Safety Net” became synonymous with the broader planning and used exclusively beginning in the summer of 2020 (East Metro law enforcement, however, did not use “OSN”).

In mid-January of 2021, DPS Commissioner John Harrington and many of the state’s chief law enforcement officers identified a need for a broader planning group to ensure that both metropolitan area and statewide concerns were reviewed and addressed. At Commissioner Harrington’s direction, a Unified Planning Team (UPT) was formed, which consisted of members of MPD, HCSO, Minnesota State Patrol (MSP), Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), DPS’ Homeland Security and Emergency Management division (HSEM), Minnesota National Guard (MNNG), Saint Paul Police Department (SPPD), University of Minnesota Police Department (UMPD), and Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO). Additionally, an Executive Committee comprised of senior leadership within each agency was created to provide leadership and guidance.

OSN consisted of four planning phases:

Phase 1 Planning and Preparation (January 18, 2021 – March 8, 2021) - Normal staffing

Phase 2 Trial (Beginning March 8, 2021) – Increased staffing

Phase 3 Jury Deliberation/Verdict (affected by April 11, 2021, killing of Duante Wright) - Maximum staffing

Phase 4 Post-verdict/De-mobilization phase (April 23, 2021 – April 26, 2021) – Reduced staffing, as circumstances allowed, until normal staffing was achieved

One of the challenges the UPT faced was law enforcement staffing for Phase 3 operations for assignments in the City of Minneapolis. The UPT made numerous requests directly to mutual aid partners and Sheriffs and Chiefs of Police throughout Minnesota. Many agencies voiced interest in helping, but Minneapolis’ mutual aid agreement did not offer liability coverage and securing a third-party insurance policy proved to be cost-
prohibitive. This resulted in many agencies declining to provide assistance. Ultimately, however, the UPT was able to secure enough law enforcement assistance to staff all critical locations.

Additionally, House File 445, the State Aid for Emergencies (SAFE) account, was introduced in the legislature as a state contingency fund to reimburse local communities for public safety-related, mutual aid overtime and staffing costs incurred after a significant critical incident. Provisions of House File 445 allowed for law enforcement agencies to apply directly to DPS for reimbursement of costs incurred during financially-overwhelming critical incidents. Local governments seeking assistance would have been eligible for reimbursement of 75% of their expenses; agencies responding to a request for assistance would have been eligible for reimbursement of 100% of their expenses. The Governor supported the measure, but the proposal was not approved by the legislature.

On April 11, 2021, Brooklyn Center Police Department (BCPD) officer Kim Potter shot and killed Daunte Wright during a traffic stop. Wright’s death sparked protests - both peaceful and violent - as well as acts of arson, looting, and property damage in Brooklyn Center and other metropolitan area cities. The UPT shifted its immediate focus from the Chauvin trial and elevated the OSN plan to Phase 3 staffing to provide operational support to Brooklyn Center and the other cities impacted by the violence related to Wright’s death. The UPT then informed BCPD that its physical presence was needed at the Emergency Operations Center and MPD’s Emergency Operations and Training Facility. Further complicating OSN planning, on Tuesday, April 13, BCPD Chief Tim Gannon resigned, and Mayor Mike Elliott relieved City Manager Curt Boganey of his duties. BCPD Commander Tony Gruenig was immediately named Acting Chief and police oversight was transferred from the City Manager to the Mayor. HCSO then stepped in as the lead agency in the response to the protests.

Media presence at the protest events continued to create significant challenges. Following the events of May-June 2020, many recommendations were suggested, including standardized credentialing and “safe zones” for the media (nearby areas where media was exempted from arrest, but still allowed to record the events). During the Duante Wright protests, some members of the media in Brooklyn Center objected to being directed to “safe zones” and later alleged various forms of mistreatment by law enforcement. Given that not all professed media were credentialed, law enforcement struggled to identify members of the media in this very chaotic environment - which included mass arrests. On Friday, April 16, 2021, a temporary restraining order (TRO) in an ongoing lawsuit involving freelance journalists and MSP was granted. The TRO exempted the media from dispersal orders and, as a result, MSP did not engage with the media and any possible implementation of “safe zones” was abandoned. Instead, DPS leaders considered other ways of addressing media concerns at protest events, ultimately retaining the consulting firm, 21CP Solutions, which facilitated conversations between the media and public safety leaders to better understand the issues and find solutions. 21CP Solutions provided its report to DPS in December 2021.

Unified Planning Team Areas for Improvement

- Recognize the need for unified command, but prevent an increase in the size of the UPT to ensure its ability to quickly develop and implement strategic plans.
- The UPT and unified command must ensure that all stakeholders with significant roles and responsibilities are involved in the command and control process.
- Ensure a Joint Information Center (JIC) is integrated into the unified command center at the onset and its role is clearly defined. Ensure all communications, electronic, and technological resources are in place as soon as possible to prevent diminished or compromised capabilities.
• Create clear lines of operational control for the various law enforcement (LE) entities and MNNG when operating under unified command.
• Schedule regular meetings of DPS legal staff, participating LE agencies’ legal divisions, and the Attorney General’s Office at the onset of planning.

Operational Areas for Improvement
• Better communicate the roles and responsibilities of the unified command center and its ability to reassign and move resources and improve lines of communication.
• Ensure individuals with decision-making authority in the unified command structure are in place at the onset of the incident.
• Clarify for local LE that mission assignments received for MNNG are subject to change and resources may be redeployed to accomplish changing mission demands and objectives.
• Develop strategy for media involvement that allows for access, but also recognizes the need to ensure the safety of the public and the media.

Communications Technology and Capabilities Areas for Improvement
• Develop a statewide encrypted radio plan with Allied Radio Matrix for Emergency Response (ARMER) system to allow LE and Fire and emergency medical services (EMS) to access secure communications.
• Provide guidance on “common operating picture” messaging from the IPAWS system, to avoid conflicting alerts, standardize messaging, and coordinate the message sending.

Office of Communications Areas for Improvement
• Enhanced information sharing from the unified command center to the JIC, with an emphasis on upcoming or planned actions.
• Better information flow to and from the Community Engagement and Outreach and the Intergovernmental Relations teams. Even with a dedicated liaison, the information did not flow from the JIC in a consistent and useful manner.
• More uniformed Public Information Officers (PIOs) assigned to DPS.
• More consistency in social content, and presenting information in one voice.

Fire and Life Safety Areas for Improvement
• Ensure the State Fire Marshal division’s (SFM) involvement at the creation of the UPT and then link with the Fire/Life Safety sub-committees.
• Include SFM stakeholders in the planning process of MNNG assignments to ensure adequate security forces are available for Fire and EMS service personnel.
• Develop a process to expedite MNNG and LE resource assignments needed to support Fire and EMS service personnel.

Intelligence Areas for Improvement
• Work with unified command to establish priority intelligence requirements and key questions for the intelligence team.
• Unified command staff should stress the importance of responding to intelligence requests received by participating agencies.
• Due to the significant amount of looting and arson, state, county, and city criminal LE investigators should be incorporated into intelligence operations.
• Need for a designated, state-provided workspace.

Community Engagement and Outreach Areas for Improvement

• The demand for OSN meetings and listening sessions by community and business leaders was far greater than DPS staff availability.
• Need for DPS to take a more proactive role in ensuring affected local jurisdictions engage with their communities and business leaders when state assistance/assets are involved.
• Securing translators and interpreters was difficult, which resulted in ineffective communication with many culturally and ethnically diverse groups.
• Engage community members and business leaders as soon as possible, keeping them informed and encouraging them to participate in the exchange of information.

Accountability Group Areas for Improvement

• Involve the Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) earlier in the planning process to allow for better outreach and communications with the public during and after the incident response.
• Coordinate with DPS’ Office of Communications (OOC) to ensure the public is aware of the IAU process and how to access it.
• More staff preparation and resources needed to accommodate calls and complaints.

Intergovernmental Relations Areas for Improvement

• Include Intergovernmental Relations in communications planning, which will allow the team to address questions and concerns posed by stakeholders.
• DPS divisions with key roles in the mission should designate a spokesperson to allow its senior leadership to act in command and control roles when necessary.
• Assign designated liaisons to the JIC to ensure information sharing.

Interagency Coordination Areas for Improvement

• Establish this team early in the planning process, allowing sufficient time to develop clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and mission. Clarify for cabinet-level commissioners how their agencies may be impacted by the incident and related issues.
• Determine how to handle the media response when multi-agencies are involved, determine who speaks for the group, and develop and share talking points.
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Commissioner Harrington directed DPS’ directly-involved divisions to conduct a review of each division’s involvement in the OSN planning and deployment activities. The purpose of this internally-focused review was to determine both what DPS did well and what could be improved. Divisions were asked to compile information documenting the events, challenges, and achievements of the planning and response activities from mid-January 2021, when the Unified Planning Team (UPT) was activated, through April 25, 2021, when the Chauvin trial and related activities concluded. DPS divisions held discussions with key personnel to collect information for this review. Submissions were made by:

- Commissioner’s Office
- Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA)
- Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)
- Minnesota State Patrol (MSP)
- Office of Communications (OOC)
- State Fire Marshal (SFM)
- Internal Affairs (IAU)
- Community Affairs and Outreach (CAO)
- Intergovernmental activities (IGA)

It is important to reiterate that this initial report focuses only on DPS and its divisions. Many other agencies participated in the planning and response, including MPD, SPPD, HCSO, UMPD, MTPD, other local LE agencies, HCMC, the DNR, Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT), and the Minnesota Department of Military Affairs and MNNG. DPS did not seek information from these entities nor review their actions to determine strengths and lessons learned. This report mentions these agencies only in the context of DPS’ actions and how they may have intersected with the other entities’ responses. This report may differ from reviews prepared by those entities, including the After Action Review prepared by MNNG.

Events Surrounding the Derek Chauvin Trial and the Killing of Duante Wright

George Floyd died on Monday, May 25, 2020, while physically restrained by MPD officers. Peaceful demonstrations began shortly after the release of a video of that incident. On Tuesday, May 26, 2020, MPD fired the four officers involved in the arrest, and the BCA began an investigation into Floyd’s in-custody death. Beginning the evening of Wednesday, May 27, 2020, some of the peaceful demonstrations degenerated into widespread rioting, arson, and looting.¹

Former MPD officer Derek Chauvin was arrested on Friday, May 29, 2020, and initially charged with third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter. On Wednesday, June 3, 2020, the charges were amended to include second-degree murder. Following six days of jury selection, the trial began on Monday, March 29, 2021. Chauvin was found guilty on all counts on Tuesday, April 20, 2021.

¹ DPS conducted an After Action Review of the events of May-June 2020, which was released publicly in March 2021. Other than to provide context for actions taken by OSN, this report does not address DPS’ response to the events of May-June 2020.
On Sunday, April 11, 2021, as the Chauvin trial proceeded, BCPD officer Kim Potter fatally shot Duante Wright, a 20-year old, African-American male, during a traffic stop. The shooting sparked numerous days of protests - both peaceful and violent - as well as acts of arson, looting, and property damage. The UPT adapted the ongoing OSN planning to include a response plan to assist the City of Brooklyn Center. The UPT response to this incident ended on Saturday, April 24, 2021.

**DPS Lessons Learned**

As with any of its critical response efforts, DPS learned lessons from the planning and response to the May-June 2020 civil unrest related to the death of George Floyd. Presented here in the Lessons Learned section of this internally-focused DPS review are strengths and areas for improvement of OSN and the interceding Brooklyn Center events, both of which implemented many of the lessons learned from the May-June 2020 civil unrest.

**Unified Planning Team**

Incident response from multiple agencies and jurisdictions requires management infrastructure able to advance mission priorities, deploy resources effectively, and avoid duplication and waste. To plan for and manage an effective response, the agencies and units involved need a unified command structure and coordination.

DPS identified the command and coordination strengths and areas for improvement are especially relevant for the following DPS divisions:

- Commissioner’s Office
- MSP
- HSEM
- DPS Legal Staff

**Command and Coordination Strengths**

**Clarity of action items:** The UPT quickly divided the planning process into four phases, which provided an easy-to-understand concept of operations for all involved.

- Phase 1 - Planning and Preparations
- Phase 2 - Trial Phase and Partial Activation
- Phase 3 - Jury Deliberations and Full Deployment
- Phase 4 - Stand Down and Demobilization

**Emphasizing joint action:** DPS and numerous chief law enforcement officers identified the need to unite state, city, county, and federal agencies in a coordinated planning response for potential civil unrest, arson, and rioting, as seen in May-June 2020.

**Unified command and control:** Recognizing this need, DPS and partner agencies established a unified command structure by creating the UPT. DPS also saw the need for a statewide incident response and used the UPT to guide agencies in their support of local efforts without compromising the decision-making authority of MPD and other local LE commands.
Leadership: The formation of the UPT, which worked with MPD’s Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC), facilitated the assembling of leadership required for successful resolution of prolonged incidents during the Chauvin trial and the unanticipated officer-involved shooting in Brooklyn Center.

Command and Coordination Areas for Improvement

Limit the unified command group participation: Recognize the need for unified command, but prevent an increase in the size of the UPT to ensure its ability to quickly develop and implement strategic plans. Balance the numbers of personnel designated to participate, acknowledging that too many active participants can result in delays in decision-making, but also allowing the addition of seats to the UPT for LE agencies who were not involved at the outset of planning, but later became necessary.

Ensure all major stakeholders are represented: The UPT and unified command must ensure that all stakeholders with significant roles and responsibilities are involved in the command and control process. Allow for additional seats to be added to the UPT for agencies who had not been part of the original OSN planning. For example, West Metro was not involved initially but was later necessary when Brooklyn Center needed additional resources.

Joint Information Center integration. Ensure a JIC is integrated into the unified command center at the onset and its role is clearly defined. Initially, JIC staff did not have a desk on the main floor due to room size of the command center. As the incident evolved, the space was adjusted and JIC was assigned two spaces on the main floor.

Clarity of operational control for National Guard personnel. Create clear lines of operational control for the various LE entities and MNNG when operating under unified command. As the Brooklyn Center incident escalated, MNNG personnel were re-deployed from assignments in Minneapolis and St. Paul. While the moves were approved at the UPT command level, they created unease within MNNG and local leadership.

More involvement of agency legal departments. Schedule regular meetings of DPS legal staff, participating LE agencies’ legal divisions, and the Attorney General’s Office at the onset of planning. This promotes collaboration and accountability when arrests or incidents occur.

Operations

Operational considerations include who will do what, when, and with what resources. The focus is on assessing a situation, facilitating coordination among responding partners, assigning responsibility, and deploying resources to operationalize the priorities set by unified command.

The operational strengths and areas for improvement are especially relevant for the following DPS divisions:

- HSEM
- MSP

Operational Strengths

Planning operations: DPS and its MACC partners were brought in early to the planning process and reviewed Minneapolis’ base, OSN strategic operations plan. Gaps in the plan were identified and addressed, and any duplication was eliminated. This resulted in the restoration of order and mitigated
injuries, property damage, and potential loss of life during the Brooklyn Center incident and was later used to address any post-trial issues in Minneapolis.

**Establishing staging locations:** Based on lessons learned from the May-June 2020 civil unrest, staging locations that provided security and reasonable proximity to anticipated incident locations were identified. This allowed for rapid assignment of resources when necessary.

**Rapid action:** Based on lessons learned, the establishment of a Tactical Operations Center allowed tactical leaders within the MACC to choose the best course of action to accomplish the mission directed by the Incident Commander.

**Assessing and predicting civil unrest and criminal behavior:** DPS played an important role in timely data gathering and predictive analysis based on criminal behavior, which allowed for efficient assignment and deployment of resources for the mission. Notable strengths for assessment included:

- Participation in a unified intelligence group made up of city, county, state, and federal membership with established streams of information and reporting structure.
- Using MSP aviation resources and CCTV resources for real-time area views to assess risks, threats, and focal points for operationalizing the MPD Incident Commander’s objectives.
- Quickly adapting staffing assignments to address hotspots and potential flashpoints, including the State Capitol and the Governor’s residence.

**Deploying resources:** DPS and its personnel developed and implemented plans to strengthen protective measures at key locations and worked with partners to deploy personnel and equipment where needed based on evolving circumstances and intelligence. Achievements in deployment included:

- Rapidly assembling and assigning MSP and DNR Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams in key roles to restore order and protect property.
- Using MNNG soldiers to provide security at fire stations, LE locations, and other key infrastructure sites.
- Assigning MSP and MNNG personnel to ensure safe operations at the State Capitol and the Governor’s residence.
- Developing tactics to embed MNNG staff into MFF groups to provide security for MFF activities.
- Assigning traffic enforcement teams when protestors illegally utilized the highways in and around the metropolitan area.
- Assigning property protection teams at specific locations in the metropolitan area to protect critical infrastructure, including drug stores, grocery stores, and banks.
- Deploying MnDOT staff to the MACC to discuss and implement planned road closures during marches and curfew hours.
- Coordinating with local sheriffs’ office personnel to handle bookings and transportation for arrests by MSP and DNR MFF groups, which allowed those groups to rapidly redeploy where needed.
- Installing two layers of fencing at critical infrastructure and “flashpoint locations,” which provided distance between protestors and LE and successfully de-escalated tensions.
Operational Areas for Improvement

**National Guard and Unified Command interaction:** Better communicate the roles and responsibilities of the unified command center and its ability to reassign and move resources and improve the lines of communication. Clarify for local LE that mission assignments received for MNNG are subject to change and resources may be redeployed to accomplish changing mission demands and objectives. The UPT command group re-deployed MNNG personnel from assignments in Minneapolis and St. Paul. While the moves were needed and approved, the moves created unease within MNNG and local leadership.

**Contingency law enforcement groups:** Pre-planning should encompass contingency LE groups (e.g., the West Metro Mobile Field Force, a composite of LE officers and leadership), as well as larger units, to quickly respond to various types of activity.

**Agency participation:** Ensure top-down mission briefings occur for each operational period, which will reinforce operational objectives and avoid mixed messages and tasking. Assemble a broader group of SPPD and RCSO command and staff during planning activities.

**Strategy for media involvement:** Develop strategy for media involvement that allows for access, but also recognizes the need to ensure both the public’s and the media’s safety.

Communications Technology and Capabilities

Effective, coordinated incident response requires adequate and interoperable communications methods and technology. Responders need to communicate with each other and receive and analyze information from members of the public affected by the incident.

The strengths and areas for improvement regarding communications technology and capabilities are especially relevant for the following DPS divisions:

- BCA
- HSEM
- MSP
- ECN

Communications Technology and Capabilities Strengths

**Leadership responsibilities:** DPS worked with numerous partners to create a strong communications plan, involving radios, phones, and dispatch centers. DPS became an informal leader during this planning, and helped mediate differences, vetted requests, and provided end goals.

**Establishing communications across response partners:** Use of ARMER by DPS and incident response partners allowed agencies and units in different radio talk groups to communicate with each other. Established in 2004, ARMER allows shared, 700/800 MHz digital trunked radio communication among approved, participating governments and organizations in Minnesota.

**Predefined radio operational channels:** A group of trained communications leaders designed and implemented radio assignments to ensure that ARMER system assignments were organized for adequate capacity and flexibility.
**Assistance to Minneapolis with emergency calls:** ECN assisted with establishing “overload” telecommunicators and dispatchers to support the Minneapolis Emergency Communication Center in anticipation of an overwhelming number of calls from the public about incendiary devices and fires.

**Communications Technology and Capabilities Areas for Improvement**

**Improvements for ARMER:** Develop a statewide encrypted radio plan with Allied Radio Matrix for Emergency Response (ARMER) system to allow LE and fire and emergency medical services to access secure communications. Broader deployment of encrypted radios is needed to allow for communications that cannot be compromised by scanners or online applications. Continue to enhance and refine the receiving and dispatching of calls for service during high-volume incidents to ensure they do not go unanswered.

**IPAWS messaging:** Provide guidance on common operating picture messaging from the IPAWS system, to avoid conflicting alerts, standardize messaging, and coordinate the message sending.

**Public Information Officer/Joint Information Center**

Effective, coordinated public messaging requires proactive involvement and rapid response to fast-changing incidents. Additionally, unified command must work closely with the PIO/JIC to ensure timely and accurate adequate information is being developed and released.

The strengths and areas for improvement regarding public messaging are especially relevant for the following DPS divisions:

- Office of Communications

**Office of Communications Strengths**

**Structure and roles within the JIC:** Working with a diverse group of city, county, and state PIOs allowed for successful collaboration in light of the numerous agencies involved and the number of staff working remotely.

**Chain of command:** Leadership was well established. Staff knew to whom to direct questions during their JIC shifts.

**Good group communications:** Information was relayed in a timely manner to staff allowing them to move into their duties at their appointed time in a calm, prepared manner.

**Office of Communications Areas for Improvement**

**Communications with Command:** Enhanced information sharing from the unified command center to the JIC, with an emphasis on upcoming or planned actions. An increase in information sharing from the command level, especially in advance of announcements or incident response.

**Communications with Community Engagement and Outreach/Intergovernmental Relations:** Better information provided to and received from the Community Engagement and Outreach and the Intergovernmental Relations teams. Even with a dedicated liaison, the information did not flow from the JIC in a consistent and useful form. Need for OOC to prioritize better engagement and involvement with the community.
**Increased resources:** More uniformed PIOs assigned to DPS. The OOC did not have access to LE software, which caused delays in the release of information and the OOC’s media-related strategies directed to the public. The WebEOC information-sharing platform was difficult to navigate and information was hard to locate.

**Social media:** More consistency in social content, and presenting information in one voice.

**Fire and Life Safety Operations**

Fires and other threats to life safety present a critical challenge for agencies and units responding to civil unrest. If criminals are setting fires, fire departments must be able to respond. Uncontrolled fires embolden other criminals and lead to more fires. Effective response to fires protects life safety and property and demonstrates to the public that the situation is under control.

The strengths and areas for improvement regarding fire and life safety are especially relevant for the following DPS divisions:

- SFM
- HSEM

**Fire and Life Safety Operations Strengths**

**Connecting with the MACC:** SFM’s involvement was virtual initially and then changed to a continued, physical MACC presence, where it assisted in the facilitation of fire-related requests.

**Providing expertise:** SFM offered specialized expertise in decisions related to fire missions, hazmat, and arson cases.

**Linking to key state resources:** SFM was prepared to link the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives for arson investigations and the state’s bomb squads and hazmat response teams, if needed.

**Linking to local fire chiefs:** SFM maintained direct and constant contact with chief fire officers in affected cities, rapidly connecting them with other state agencies.

**Supporting fire departments statewide:** SFM shared and received intelligence from fire departments across the state and stood ready to mobilize fire department resources through the Statewide Mutual Aid Plan, which provides local fire chiefs with easy access to fire service resources in major emergencies.

**Coordinating with the EMS providers:** EMS providers had a consistent presence in the MACC and were able, through SFM, to facilitate requests for service and validate the MACC’s concept for operations.

**Fire and Life Safety Areas for Improvement**

**Earlier participation:** Ensure SFM involvement at the creation of the UPT and then link with the Fire/Life Safety sub-committees. As the original concept was focused on a local government (the City of Minneapolis), SFM became involved late in the planning process.

**Safety and security of Fire and EMS personnel:** Include SFM stakeholders in the planning process of MNNG assignments to ensure adequate security forces are available for Fire and EMS service personnel.
Develop a process to expedite MNNG and LE resource assignments needed to support Fire and EMS service personnel.

**Intelligence Gathering and Sharing**

Planning and potentially responding to large-scale incidents of protest and civil unrest requires clear, accurate, and timely information. Incident command must have accurate intelligence to establish priorities and decide on appropriate strategies. Accurate, shared intelligence is also critical for the agencies and units that take action in response to the incident.

The strengths and areas for improvement regarding intelligence gathering and sharing are especially relevant for the following DPS division:

- BCA

**Intelligence Strengths**

**Use of the Minnesota Fusion Center (MNFC):** The MNFC facilitated collaboration between the Minneapolis Strategic Information Center (SIC), Hennepin County Criminal Information and Sharing Center (CISA) and the FBI’s intelligence analysts located at the Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) and those onsite in the MACC, as well as all the agencies involved in intelligence-gathering efforts. MNFC used a digital chatroom to engage with its analysts statewide. Operated by the BCA with participation from many law enforcement agencies statewide, MNFC collected, evaluated, analyzed, and disseminated information about organized criminal, terrorist, and all-hazards activity in the state.

**Viewing activity in real time:** The intelligence team for the coordinated response used live cameras and other surveillance technology to view activities and analyze the evolving situation.

**Sharing information in the MACC:** The intelligence team was able to efficiently share information because it was onsite in the MACC and in close proximity to leaders of the coordinated response.

**Developing and distributing Intelligence bulletins:** Based on lessons learned from the May-June 2020 incident response, the intelligence team was able to develop a concise intelligence bulletin for distribution and in-person briefings.

**Adaptive personnel:** As with any event, planned or unplanned, needs change frequently. MNFC rapidly adapted to these changes and the need for expedited intelligence products.

**Intelligence Areas for Improvement**

**Intelligence requirements:** Work with unified command staff to establish priority intelligence requirements and key questions for the intelligence team. Avoid fluctuating timelines for intelligence products, particularly on short notice, as it does not always allow for a quality product.

**The importance of Intelligence:** Unified command staff should stress the importance of responding to intelligence requests received by participating agencies. With the prevalence of disinformation, field investigations are key to confirming or refuting social media. Include the Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) in the distribution of the communication plan, including any changes, to ensure proper monitoring by the IOC.
Involvement of criminal case investigators: Due to the significant amount of looting and arson, state, county, and city criminal LE investigators should be incorporated into intelligence operations.

State-provided workspace for Intelligence: Need for a designated, state-provided workspace. All Intel analysts working from the same venue is most preferable. Space limitations, however, did not allow for this and most analysts were located at the FBI IOC, which came with several limitations, including difficulty with cell phones working, needing pre-approval for electronic devices, and access to WiFi. Additionally, during Phase I and Phase II, there were instances of the FBI not wishing to open the IOC during hours previously discussed and approved by OSN.

Community Engagement and Outreach

For situations where civil unrest is a possibility and may involve responses from many agencies and jurisdictions, community and business leaders and the public require timely information. Those coordinating the response must keep community and business leaders and the general public informed.

The strengths and areas for improvement for community engagement and outreach are especially relevant for the following DPS divisions:

- Commissioner’s Office
- Community Affairs
- Office of Communications

Community Engagement and Outreach Strengths

Strong communication messaging: Coordinated and/or presented in excess of 75 OSN general community or business community-related meetings with affected stakeholders.

9-1-1 concerns: Brought forward concerns about the capacity of the City of Minneapolis’ 911 call center. These concerns were prompted by community feedback during the May-June 2020 civil unrest - callers could not get through to 911 due to high call volumes.

Community Engagement and Outreach Areas for Improvement

Demands exceeded staffing: The demand for OSN meetings and listening sessions by community and business leaders was far greater than DPS staff availability. Need additional resources for incident response meetings and listening sessions with community and business leaders, which includes engaging with grassroots peacekeeping organizations in advance.

Engage local jurisdictions: Need for DPS to take a more proactive role in ensuring affected local jurisdictions engage with their communities and business leaders when state assistance/assets are involved. It later became apparent that the community outreach from partners had not been at an adequate level prior to implementing OSN, despite repeated assurances. All entities participating in operations should be performing community outreach, ideally in a coordinated manner.

Language barriers: Securing translators and interpreters was difficult, which resulted in ineffective communication with many culturally and ethnically diverse groups.

Input from the community and business leaders: Engage community members and business leaders as soon as possible, keeping them informed and encouraging them to participate in the exchange of
information. In addition to briefings, create opportunities for community groups and business leaders to provide feedback related to the public safety response. Input should also be sought during and, to the extent possible, after an incident.

**Standardized messaging:** Need for a uniform public-facing OSN presentation that anyone involved with DPS-OSN can present instead of varying presentations. Additionally, messaging was focused on outward-facing communications instead of receiving information from the community. A standard place to receive information and a way to close the loop with community would benefit large-scale operations.

It should be noted that while there were initial challenges associated with OSN and Community Engagement and Outreach, the fact that a critical incident occurred during OSN created additional, unique challenges. The significant police response required in Brooklyn Center led to confusion regarding how to communicate with, and receive input from, the Brooklyn Center community about OSN’s mission and how it differed from the Brooklyn Center incident response. Additional preparation should focus on local and organized community peacekeeping teams’ readiness for engagement.

**Accountability Group**

Incident response personnel are held to high standards and their actions are closely scrutinized. When the public feels these standards are not met, or violations of policy or laws occur, an easy-to-access system to voice concerns and/or file complaints must be implemented.

The strengths and areas for improvement for accountability are especially relevant for the following DPS Divisions:

- Commissioner’s Office
- Internal Affairs Unit

**Accountability Group Strengths**

**Diverse group membership:** The Accountability Group consisted of the law enforcement agencies located in the communities most directly involved in or affected by the Chauvin trial. This group exchanged contact information for urgent matters. The group also exchanged complaint-filing information to assist citizens who may have needed contact information.

**Outreach:** The group created a source document (FAQs) for use by the media to share information regarding accountability and the complaint process.

**Ease of reporting:** Citizens with concerns or complaints regarding OSN personnel needed only to make one call to have their concerns or questions addressed.

**Adaptability:** The Brooklyn Center incident response was not anticipated in the planning process, requiring IAU to determine which agencies were involved and establish communications with them should a complaint be filed.
**Accountability Group Areas for Improvement**

**Earlier involvement**: Involve the IAU earlier in the planning process to allow for better outreach and communications with the public during and after the incident response. The Accountability Group could have been more effective with more time to prepare and disseminate communications to the involved communities. Because the group formed in mid-February, the timeframe limited the group’s ability to undertake novel and/or resource-intensive ideas.

**OOC coordination**: Coordinate with the OOC to ensure the public is aware of the IAU process and how to access it.

**Staff preparation**: More staff preparation and resources needed to accommodate calls and complaints. Preparation should include the agency’s message, available resources, and de-escalation techniques.

**Intergovernmental Relations**

For situations where civil unrest is a possibility and may involve responses from many agencies and jurisdictions, government officials and community leaders require timely information. Those coordinating the response must keep government and community leaders informed. They will also be called upon to share information with the broader public and those affected by the unrest.

The strengths and areas for improvement for intergovernmental relations are especially relevant for the following DPS divisions:

- Commissioner’s Office
- Legislative Affairs

**Intergovernmental Relations Strengths**

**Providing updates to external leaders**: Provided regular updates to elected officials and community leaders, which helped the state disseminate accurate information broadly in a timely way and allowed leaders to better manage rumor control.

**Use of Executive Council**: Engaged members of the state’s Executive Council to add important perspective and non-traditional leadership voices to assist in the dissemination of accurate information.

**Information validation**: Overcame the challenge of information passing through numerous sources by validating and distributing the correct messages.

**Intergovernmental Relations Areas for Improvement**

**Involvement in planning**: Include Intergovernmental Relations in communications planning, which will allow the team to address questions and concerns posed by stakeholders. Coordinate the issuance and implementation of curfews and other executive-issued orders, when possible.

**Spokesperson from key divisions**: DPS divisions with key roles in the mission should designate a spokesperson to allow its senior leadership to act in command and control roles when necessary.

**Need for JIC liaisons**: Assign designated liaisons to the JIC to ensure information sharing. When legal issues arose during the Brooklyn Center incident response, this group was not included in internal
discussions related to messaging and resolution and was unable to address questions and concerns posed by stakeholders.

**Interagency Coordination Team**

There was the possibility of civil unrest similar to May-June 2020 based on the outcome of the Derek Chauvin trial. Had this occurred, assistance from many state agencies would have been needed. Commissioner Harrington requested all cabinet-level commissioners assess how their respective agencies might be impacted by the trial and any potential unrest.

The strengths and areas for improvement for interagency coordination are especially relevant for the following DPS Divisions:

- Commissioner’s Office

**Interagency Coordination Team Strengths**

**Communication:** The Interagency Coordination Team, consisting of cabinet-level deputy commissioners, was sufficiently informed and provided with timely and relevant information.

**Common operating picture:** Agencies normally not included in LE operations were “read in” and given regular intelligence updates to better equip them to prepare.

**Pre-planning:** Proactive time to plan for the “what ifs” and how their respective agencies might be needed in a larger response, or how they may be affected.

**Interagency Coordination Team Areas for Improvement**

**Clarity:** This was a newly formed group that did not have clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and mission initially, which led to confusion within the group. This team should be established early in the planning process, allowing sufficient time to develop clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and mission. Clarify for cabinet-level commissioners how their agencies may be impacted by the incident and related issues. Consider a set of criteria to be used to determine when the group should be activated. Such action will ensure the correct individuals are involved and that there is a clear understanding of the purpose of the team. In addition, this will also assist with developing the schedule or criteria for when the Interagency Coordination Team should meet.

**Media relations:** Determine how to handle the media response when multi-agencies are involved, determine who speaks for the group, and develop and share talking points.

**Conclusion**

In initial notes and ideas shared within the agency, DPS divisions involved in the planning and deployment activities of January 2021 to May 2021 and unrest of April 2021 highlighted departmental strengths and offered areas for improvement. In addition to this information, DPS will continue to use the lessons learned from the May-June 2020 civil unrest for introspection and future incident response.